




A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 






 Richard Cante 
 Ken Hillis 






(Under the direction of Professor Richard Cante) 
 
This paper investigates digital art as a means with which to reflect on wider 
cultural patterns of everyday digital interactions.  Specifically, it attends to an ongoing 
debate in new media studies focused on the relationship between digital technologies and 
narrative.  Lured by the promise of libratory new narrative forms and utopic interactivity, 
much recent scholarship has been mired in the investigation of the narrative paradigm to 
the exclusion of potentially more useful concepts that directly acknowledge the sensing 
subject.  This paper aims to illuminate the material digital aesthetic of ephemerality that 
increasingly supplants narrative primacy in the relationship between perception and 
digital realizations.  Analysis of new media theorist Lev Manovich’s algorithmically 
driven digital art project Soft Cinema, as well as other database-driven digital works, 
provides what I argue is a clearer set of tools with which to understand the relationship 
between temporality, materiality, digitality, and sensing bodies.   
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The critical aim of this paper is to trace a temporal aesthetic that arises between sensing 
bodies and digital realizations.  That aesthetic, what I call digital ephemerality, is pervasive 
in contemporary digital culture.  And it continues to arise as a persistent theme in time-based 
digital art.  Recently, phenomenology has become increasingly popular in new media studies 
as a potential tool for theorizing subjective perception and the digital.  The absence of tools 
with which to theorize the relationship between material senses and the formal specificity of 
the digital realization precipitated this move, and it has shown promise as a method with 
which to incorporate sensory subjectivity in the face of neo-formalism and strict cognitivist 
navigations of meaning in media studies.   
 Another branch of recent new media scholarship and art deals with the possibilities for 
reinventing and reconceptualizing narrative in tandem with the possibilities afforded by new 
digital technologies.  This paper will take a necessarily polemical stance toward this 
scholarship, in particular toward the original theory behind new media theorist and artist Lev 
Manovich’s digital media project Soft Cinema. Following the formal premises of a multi-
frame interface, multiple image formats (3-D, graphics, images, animation), and software 
controlled real-time editing, Soft Cinema promises a kind of future cinema—an always new 
and always changing form of narrative predicated upon the technical coding of the software.1
While problematic as theorized by its creators, Soft Cinema still provides us with an excellent 
gateway into a discussion of temporal aesthetics and the presence of these aesthetics in 
everyday digital culture. However, the rash of narrative theory that dominates new media 
 
1 This paper will generally refer to the following DVD in place of the installation: Manovich, Lev & Andreas 
Kratky. Soft Cinema. 2002-2005. DVD and Book. 
2scholarship,2 specifically the perspective that drives Manovich’s project, requires us to 
rescue this technology in the face of formal suffocation.  It is essential to look beyond the 
confines of simple structure to begin to understand the subject in its ideological, material, 
and/or social complexity.  At root, this paper attempts to devalue such neo-narratology and 
point out alternatives for understanding embodied subjectivity in time.   
 Ultimately, I engage with the temporal aesthetic as part of a larger push toward 
acknowledging the politics of the “haptic.”  The term haptic first references touch and the 
corporeal, but more generally it incorporates the sensory and the material.  Whether it is 
sensing bodies or embodied technologies, the haptic underscores the immediate but extensive 
materiality of the subjective interaction (Marks xiii).  Time-based digital art like Soft Cinema 
can help us navigate a more progressive path through the pervasiveness of digitality in the 
everyday, but only if we acknowledge the specificity of the relationship between bodies and 
the virtual.   
 Ephemerality is traditionally devalued as an aesthetic.  This paper points toward a different 
perspective that is hinged on the potential of the sensory dimension of an ephemeral 
aesthetic.  The subject who engages with the digital ephemeral potentially becomes a haptic 
critic in the process, maintaining “a robust flow between sensuous closeness and symbolic 
distance” (xiii.)  Digital ephemeral as a theoretical tool allows us to engage with the 
possibilities of individuated sensory experience as part of a much broader extended context.  
As Laura Marks reminds us in her book Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media:
2 Amongst others, see selections from Rieser, Martin, & Andrea Zapp, eds. New Screen  Media: 
Cinema/Art/Narrative. London: BFI, 2002.; Ryan, Marie-Laurie. Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and 
Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.; Shields, 
Rob. “Hypertext Links: The Ethic of the Index and its Space-Time Effects.” The World Wide Web and 
Contemporary Cultural Theory. eds. Andrew Herman and Thomas Swiss. New York: Routledge, 2000.; & 
Wardrip-Fruin, Noah, and Pat Harrigan. First Person: New Media as Story, Performance, and Game.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004. 
 
3Aesthetics, as the interface between the ideal and the sensible, has been relegated in 
 dualist philosophy to an account of sensuous experience that must struggle to integrate that  
 experience into some overarching idea....It is only in an idealist world that aesthetics need 
 be torn between material and ideal.  Haptic criticism is an aesthetics in the sense that it  
 finds reason to hope for a future in, and not despite, the material and sensuous world. (xiii-  
 xiv)  
 
* * *
I. The ephemeron is a slippery fugitive.  Like the mayfly with which it shares its name, it has 
only a transitory existence.3 At heart, the ephemeron represents a relationship between the 
material and the temporal, a collapsing birth and death in a temporary time-space 
arrangement. As such, ephemera are entirely relative in their identity, and they can occupy 
both aesthetic and traditional material categories.  Ephemera have a rich history throughout 
western modernity; indeed, the recent fetishization of their fragile (im)materiality on the part 
of historians and collectors can perhaps provide us with the inspiration to renew the senso-
material register in the relationship between ephemera and digital culture.  
 The study of tangible ephemera has enjoyed a certain popularity over the last thirty to forty 
years.4 Traditional objects of interest include ticket stubs, business cards, advertisements, 
and other kinds of cheap printed matter.  Additionally, in recent years archivists have begun 
to preserve related sorts of moving-image media as well.  These artifacts, sometimes called 
ephemeral films, include educational films, industrials, amateur and home movies, and 
 
3 Mayflies, of the genus ephemeridae, live only for a day. “Ephemera” Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford UP. 
15 January 2006. Online link referenced in Bibliography. 
 
4 See, for example: Gernes, Todd S. “Recasting the Culture of Ephemera.” Popular Literacy: Studies in Cultural 
Practices and Poetics. Ed. John Trimbur. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2001. 107-127.; Mairowitz, 
David Zane, & Peter Stansill, eds. BAMN Outlaw Manifestos and Ephemera 1965-70. Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 
1999.; Preston, Cathy Lynn, & Michael J. Preston, eds. The Other Print Tradition: Essays on Chapbooks, 
Broadsides, and Related Ephemera. New York: Garland, 1995.; Rickards, Maurice. Collecting Printed 
Ephemera. Oxford: Phaidon, 1988. 
4advertisements (Dargis 1). 5 Forming a sort of semi-material armature for modern mass 
cultures, rediscovered or salvaged ephemera can provide historians with a different kind of 
anti-evidence that paints broad movements and tones as opposed to certain cause-effect 
deterministic relations.   
 In a kind of turn to New Historicism, ephemera historian Maurice Rickards claims: “Just 
as the ancients conceived of a genius loci, the soul and spirit of a place, we may perceive a 
genius papyri. In every fragment of ephemera resides the spirit of the paper, the abiding 
essence of its message, origin, and content” (16).  But historiographic potential aside, given 
the special kinds of retroactive aura ephemera maintain, the fetishization of paper ephemera 
can only grow—especially as digital communication increasingly supplants those artifacts in 
everyday life, and they become more distinctly present in their absence. 
 The realm of virtual ephemerality provides scholars with a distinct set of questions.  Is 
there, or can there be, such a thing as ephemera in digital culture?  Or, conversely, isn’t all 
digitality necessarily ephemeral?  Isn’t sensually available digital “presence” predicated on 
an interface and organizing algorithm that can only temporarily materialize that digital 
“information”?  Regardless of what kind of interface it occupies, all digital information is 
itself only an electronically driven arrangement doomed to diffusion.  For this very reason, 
Katherine Hayles marks informatics as populated by “flickering signifiers,” after Lacan’s 
“floating signifiers.”  Info discourse, she says, is characterized by a “tendency toward 
unexpected metamorphoses, attenuations, and dispersions” (30).  Therefore, digitality 
necessarily follows movements of pattern and randomness as opposed to even the 
deconstructed binary of presence and absence. In this sense, digitality actually adheres to a 
 
5 A good example of this practice can be found in the Prelinger Archives in San Francisco.  Curator Rick 
Prelinger is at the forefront of the movement to save orphan films, industrials, etc. 
5necessary aesthetic of ephemerality.  No digital realization can avoid that aesthetic by nature 
of its ontological promise.  Therefore, if we take our definition of ephemera to be 
relational—that is to say, ephemera can only be conceptualized via its relationship to more 
overt, primary, or relevant information or discourse—and if all digital culture is ephemeral 
anyway, then how can one “locate” ephemera in a digital “context”?  Furthermore, all media 
trapped in a larger context of “new digitality” fall prey to the taint of this aesthetic, despite 
their actual basis in one medium or another.   
 Baudrillard’s description of aesthetic nullity is helpful here.  For Baudrillard, access to a 
real has been made impossible by the move from signification to simulation. Contemporary 
art has responded to the “impossibilities of the real” by “confiscating banality, waste, and 
mediocrity as ideologies and values” (Baudrillard 27).  Marcel Duchamp, of course, took 
some of the first steps in this regard (most famously with his 1917 Readymade Fountain), but 
Andy Warhol perfected the practice.  Ever since then, art has scrambled to echo the embrace 
of the banal and the mundane. Baudrillard believes all culture is therefore subsumed under a 
“trans-aesthetic”—a pervasive and generalized valuation that crushes all meaning into 
nullity.  In this condition, all culture can only exist in an equilibrated time-space.  
Relationality becomes impossible in this nullity.  All is culture; all is aesthetic.   
 I, however, want to resist the temptations of this particular Baudrillardian cul-de-sac.  It is 
more productive to understand the above described pervasive “condition” of nullity as an 
“impulse” to nullity.  Indeed, this turn allows the ephemeral to exist again in the first place, 
since, as stated earlier, the ephemeron is relative and only incurs its relative status by virtue 
of its relationship to other non-ephemera.  Baudrillard’s theorization of a trans-aesthetic 
doesn’t allow for the variability that ephemera depend upon for their very conceptual 
6existence.  But a more grounded postmodern impulse towards nullity guarantees ephemeral 
possibility.6 Refashioned thus, it remains worth exploring the potential place of ephemerality 
in digital culture—especially as a persistent aesthetic that can potentially accompany, and 
perhaps inspire, new cultural forms in new time-space arrangements that reflect the 
specificities of the digital.   
 This is not technological determinism.  Technological determinism implies that 
possibilities for change are afforded specifically by technology.  Digital ephemerality insists 
on a dialogue between sensing bodies and technology as always part of a larger context.  It is 
important to recognize that the technology is always engaged with and responding to that 
context.  This is why I feel it critical to point out the possibility that broad shifts in cultural 
aesthetics are being reflected and theorized in more experimental digital artistic practices—as 
a way to reflect and engage with that context. 
 New-media theorist and artist Lev Manovich’s 2002-2005 digital art project Soft Cinema is 
a primary example of such an experimental practice.  It serves as a sufficient springboard 
towards further discussion of the ephemeral aesthetic’s broader ramifications.7 While 
Manovich deals directly with media aesthetics in his art, the theory that he produces 
alongside such work cannot adequately deal with what is perhaps the crucial component of
the ephemeral aesthetic.  Indeed, neo-formalists such as Manovich obscure the complexity of 
the relationship between subjects, time, technology and aesthetics.  Much of the following 
 
6 It is possible that Baudrillard accounts for the ephemeral in a limited sense.  He allows for the possibility of 
“singularities” that can arise against the “backdrop of a virtually flat “aesthetic encephalogram” (58).  He 
maintains that these are strictly apolitical and merely occasional, however.  For the purposes of this paper  and 
in search of a politics that transcend the postmodern dead end, that view is still too limiting. 
 
7 Soft Cinema. DVD and Book. The work was coproduced and developed with Andreas Kratky.  There are a 
host of other contributors, but because the art is considered an extension of Manovich’s theory, or at the least a 
reflection upon his database writing, I will refer to Manovich as the author of Soft Cinema. I do not mean to 
undermine the complexity of the work nor detract from the achievements of the other collaborators, but clarity 
demands that I do so anyway. 
7analysis of Manovich’s work could rightly be considered a polemic, but it is polemical for 
good reason.  The theoretical ground upon which Manovich constructs his art (theoretical 
ground that currently enjoys certain favor in much of new media studies) requires a more 
carefully measured engagement.  That theory is far too rooted in formalist accounts of user 
experience that can never account for contingency.  That is not to say that Soft Cinema is 
without merit.  Indeed, I would argue quite the opposite.  The work itself provides an 
excellent opportunity to debate the scholarship focused on digital narrativity, as well as 
offering excellent terrain in which to unpack the conceptual complexity of the digital 
aesthetic of ephemerality.   
 Manovich has been an avid participant in the dialogue around narrative in digital culture 
since new media’s conception.  These debates stem primarily from the new formal 
possibilities of the digital technologies.  It is possible to illustrate the general formal 
arrangement of digital media technology by clarifying the three primary inter-operational 
forms.  Each basic form works with and relies on the other forms to assure the digital 
realization.  At a very basic level, digital information is released into an interface through a 
hierarchical, but non-linear, process of Random Access Memory, or RAM (Le Grice 282).  
The data is generally stored in some sort of database.  Then it is released through the process 
of an algorithmic translation and organization.  The database, defined as a “structured 
collection of data,” can be classified as the dominant form of computer-based technology 
(Manovich, Language 218).  The algorithm functions as the operating “logic” of transcoding 
and data generation.  The interface of course varies according to context, technology, and 
use.  For example, the touch screen interface on a bank’s ATM works in a slightly different 
manner than a keyboard and graphical user interface on a personal computer.  The ATM 
8interface is much simpler because its command functions are limited to a highly specific set 
of tasks.  Indeed, the possibilities for the material structure of the interface are exploding as 
the mediascape broadens and variegates.  Each of these three levels then—database, 
algorithm, and interface—need each other in order for a digital media text to operate.  This is 
the standard process by which digital information is organized into a sensually available 
presence for a user (218-228). 
 Thus, the argument holds that digitality opens up the possibility for a non-linear 
“narrative” based upon the unfixed nature of its realization.  Whereas film progresses along a 
specifically linear path, digital access allows multiple permutations whereby the user can 
follow multiple narrative paths.  In this sense, the logic of the database and the algorithm 
tends to overwhelm the traditional logic of narrative.  This principal of variability constitutes 
the ground for the non-linear and fragmented narratives in/of digital media.   
* * *
II. Using Manovich’s language, we can say that there are three short “films” that comprise 
the Soft Cinema canon, each using a version of the same generative software: Texas, Mission 
to Earth, and Absences (Soft Cinema Catalog 2).8 For the purposes of this paper, I will 
concentrate on Texas, as it is the first primary example of the project, and perhaps the most 
typical treatment of Manovichean database theory.  While the work was originally created as 
an installation for a 2002 ZKM media exhibition at the Center for Art and Media in 
 
8 In truth, “film” is a misnomer here, as there is no actual film utilized in this project. Manovich desires to create 
a new form that merges cinematic and database aesthetics, and it is perhaps more suitable to his purpose to label 
them database narratives. 
9Karlsruhe, Germany, entitled “Future Cinema: Cinematic Imaginary after Film,” it was later 
redeveloped with somewhat reconceptualized content for the 2004 DVD version (9).9
More than a particular text, the title of Soft Cinema references a specific form of media 
making.  The “soft” of the title refers most obviously to “software,” and that is the driving 
component and theoretical lynchpin of this “cinema.”  In this program, software organizes 
and “edits” media from a database (or multiple databases) directly into a changing multi-
frame interface in real time.  The algorithms that control Soft Cinema are designed to produce 
the media differently with each use, so in effect the “narrative” presentation is always new 
and never repeats itself.  
 Texas utilizes several primary databases that are generally separated by media content 
type. The video database is comprised of 425 video clips that Manovich himself shot in 
different parts of the world. An audio database includes music created by composer George 
Lewis: “samples taken from his own archive of sounds” (8).  A second audio database 
consists of found sounds and digitally constructed music collected and recorded from a 
variety of sources and locations.  A separate database provides a voiceover. Other media 
content includes hand-drawn animation, written scrolling text, and abstract designs.  
 The algorithm that drives Texas selects information content from the many databases and 
arranges them into the interface in real time sequences.  This is to say that the selection and 
distribution of content occurs generally at the same time as the viewer experiences that 
content. The program is set to continue indefinitely, and each database holds hours of 
content.  The algorithm operates according to a set of 10 parameters, selecting content based 
 
9 The exhibit was was curated by Jeffrey Shaw and Peter Weibel.  Further information about the show can be 
found in their catalog of the exhibition, later published as: Shaw, Jeffrey, and Peter Weibel, eds. Future Cinema: 
The Cinematic Imaginary after Film. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 
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on “similarities” and “differences”—screen direction, contrast, subject matter, etc.  Manovich 
considers this software design to be similar to a search engine like Google (11).  This is 
because it searches for content from the databases and then rearranges that content into a 
short sequence for the user.  Every minute or so the software searches for a new set of 
content for the next sequence.  
 The interface constantly shifts formats.  But its basic structure is one horizontal rectangle 
(built to accommodate the shape of the computer screen or monitor) that is divided into 
several smaller rectangular frames.  The layout of the frames as well as the image/sound 
“content” frequently shift according to the algorithmic design of the editing software. 
Periodically, text scrolls across rectangular bands in different parts of the screen (echoing the 
aesthetic of 24-hour cable news channels and the scrolling text bars at the bottom of the 
screen).  Sometimes those same bands include bands of color or abstract, shifting, linear 
shapes.  The voiceover drones in the background, detailing a variety of stories, memories, 
and assorted other (perhaps thematically arranged) “content” culled from Manovich’s own 
short stories (Soft Cinema DVD Interview).  The sounds and music overlap and occasionally 
drop out into silence.  There are no overlays, fades, or dissolves utilized in the editing.  The 
general presentation is one of constant, shifting movement. Stillness is avoided entirely, 
almost as if the formal flow constitutes the meaning of the piece itself.  Of course this last 
conclusion is not consistent with Manovich’s overriding intent; movement for movement’s 
sake actually works in opposition to the binding tendencies of the narrative form.  Rather, his 
desire is to open up new possibilities for cognitive associations for the viewer that represent 
the broad subjective experience of the modern world—in his view, this is a narrative step.   
11
 Texas—indeed Soft Cinema itself—is part of Manovich’s larger project to create a 
“database cinema” that illustrates and illuminates new narrative possibilities: 
 Given the dominance of the database in computer software and the key role that it  
 plays in the computer-based design process, perhaps we can arrive at new kinds of     
 narrative by focusing our attention on how narrative and database can work together. How  
 can a narrative take into account the fact that its elements are organized in a database?     
 How can our new abilities to store vast amounts of data,  to automatically classify, index,   
 link, search, and instantly retrieve it, lead to new  kinds of narrative? (Manovich,  
 Language 237) 
 
However, there exist some implicit tensions in this endeavor that Manovich tries to address 
in his own work.  That is to say, Manovich straddles an uneasy paradox in his understanding 
of the relationship between new and old media and his subsequent conceptualization of the 
database narrative form. On the one hand, he is careful to acknowledge the specificities of 
digital technologies and the way those technologies relate to those who use them. But he is 
also determined to understand digital media through the social, technological, and cultural 
languages of older media.10 This creates problems. For instance, according to Manovich, 
narrative was the “key form of cultural expression of the modern age” (novels, cinema), 
while “the computer age introduces its correlate—the database” (218).  Herein lies the 
theoretical tension.  Manovich believes that the database and narrative are opposing forms.  
He writes: “As cultural form, the database represents the world as list of items, and it refuses 
to order this list.  In contrast, a narrative creates a cause-and-effect trajectory of seemingly 
unordered items (events).  Therefore, database and narrative are natural enemies” (225).  Yet, 
it is with the language of narrative that Manovich seeks to describe the logic of the subject’s 
interaction with the digital database.  It is almost as if the tension of the formal interaction 
between database and narrative constitute the only possible site of meaning for the subjective 
 
10 For instance, Manovich calls Dziga Vertov one of the 20th century’s “great database filmmakers” because of 
the manner in which Vertov utilizes montage.  See the brief introduction to The Language of New Media.
12
interaction.  While he does not wish to champion narrative exclusively, he theorizes under its 
spell, continually turning towards cinema, for instance, as the consistent partner to the 
database form.  Soft Cinema is his attempt to illuminate the possibilities of that future formal 
union. 
 Essentially, Manovich wishes to read the specificity of the technology through the 
language of its historical technological predecessors. While this is of course a worthy 
strategy for contextualizing media form and the ideological, social, and technological 
discourse that inform new media, it should not stand as the basis for all of our new media 
scholarship.  This is the same error made by new media theorists Jay David Bolter and 
Richard Grusin in their book Remediation. Their thesis holds that all media are in a dialogue 
with other media: “digital visual media can best be understood through the ways in which 
they honor, rival, and revise linear-perspective painting, photography, film, television, and 
print. No medium today, and certainly no single media event seems to do its cultural work in 
isolation from other media...” (Bolter & Grusin 15).  “Isolation” is of course impossible, and 
this is perhaps an appropriate academic response to both modernism’s devotion to the “new” 
as well as to the Academy’s rush to isolate the novelty of digital technology in New Media 
Studies.  But this kind of scholarship tends to flatten the political dimension of new media 
theory, and it limits the discussion in precisely the same way that the authors speak against.  
That is to say, instead of fetishizing newness, we end up fetishizing un-newness. This is not 
productive epistemologically; Bolter and Grusin’s thesis has obvious validity, but we need to 
look beyond traditional terms to anticipate and formulate progressive concepts and to more 
adequately address current social, cultural, and political conditions. 
13
 Unfortunately, theorists such as Manovich continue to insist on using retro-inspired 
formalist discourse in their work.  Futhermore, at least in Manovich’s case, the manner in 
which the terms of theoretical engagement are defined is mired in traditional formalist 
theory.  Citing Mieke Bal, Manovich defines narrative as having “both an actor and a 
narrator...three distinct levels consisting of the text, the story, and the fabula...and its contents 
should be ‘a series of connected events caused or experienced by actors’” (Manovich, 
Language 227).  This kind of definition, while perhaps useful for basic analysis and 
clarification of a literary or cinematic work, is certainly not helpful for a work itself 
predicated on fragments.  When Manovich claims that “obviously not all cultural objects are 
narratives” (228), he reveals his structuralist roots.  I would argue that when the subject is 
seen as a fluid site of possibility, indeed anything can be understood as narrative. 
 Marsha Kinder mounts an effective critique of Manovich’s structuralist view of narrative 
simply by calling to the fore a litany of post-structuralist narrative theory.  For example, she 
cites Teresa deLauretis: 
 Today narrative theory is no longer or not primarily intent on establishing a logic, a   
 grammar, or a formal rhetoric of narrative; what it seeks to understand is the nature of the  
 structuring and destructuring, even destructive, processes at work in textual and semiotic  
 production...a production of meaning which involves a subject in a social field. (quot. in  
 Kinder, Narrative 120) 
 
Manovich doesn’t entirely disregard subjects, but he is unusually limited to a cognitive, 
rational understanding of the viewer’s subjectivity. As Kinder notes, his work “deliberately 
avoids ideological considerations, defining narrative through a list of essential components 
and questioning whether a work ‘qualifies,’ rather than what functions it performs” (121).  It 
is important to recognize, however, that Kinder herself falls into the narrative trap. While she 
does attempt to extend the embrace of narrative to include a broader understanding of 
14
ideological context, she maintains narrative framing and subjective interpellation as the 
primary indicator of social, historical, and cultural meaning.  Even if it distances itself from 
the formalist perspective, Kinder’s perspective maintains the possibility for a kind of 
“narrative politics.”  It is clear that one of Kinder’s primary goals is to reassert “agency” into 
digital subjectivity and that she sticks to the confines of narrativity in her methodology.11 
The attempt to pin down the specificities of user interaction is not unusual in new media 
theory. Many scholars have invested a great deal of energy in the question of user “agency” 
in the face of digital technology.12 As stated earlier, because of the variability of digital 
realization, the multiple ways of reading a text are brought to the fore, formalized in the 
possibilities of the user experience itself. Furthermore, users frequently depend on devices 
like the mouse or keyboard to “control” the unfolding of these digital texts, which gives rise 
to debate over new kinds of interactivity and new potentialities for the performance of 
narrative.  Predictably, utopian politics have seized upon these narrative models as harbingers 
of potentially radical new cultural forms and practices.   
 While Manovich clearly foresees a wide range of potential with nonlinear narrative, his 
stance towards such utopianism is cautious.  Specifically, he refuses to grant any special 
agency to the user of a digital database narrative. Digital-specific interactivity, he claims, is a 
myth: “In short, we are asked to follow pre-programmed, objectively existing associations.  
 
11 For example, in her work on database narratives, Kinder attempts to point out the narrative consistencies 
between new media gaming structures and the structures of experimental films of the last half century (Agnes 
Varda’s Cleo from 5-7, Chris Marker’s La Jetée, etc.) and the ideological implications therein.  She investigates 
the specific narrative moments inherent to each that cohere to operate as a “formidable narrative machine whose 
ideological operations are exposed” in: Kinder, Marsha. “Narrative Equivocations between Movies and 
Games.”  The New Media Book. ed. Dan Harries.  London: BFI, 2002. 128.  For further examples of this trend, 
see Kinder, Marsha.  “Uncanny Visions of History: Two Experimental Documentaries from Transnational 
Spain—Asaltar los cielos and Tren de sombras.” Film Quarterly. 56.3 (2003) 12-24. 
 
12 For example, see works by Campbell, Cubitt, Feingold, Wand, Wardrip-Fruin, and Weibel, cited in 
Bibliography. 
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Put differently, in what can be read as an updated version of French philosopher Louis 
Althusser’s concept of ‘interpellation,’ we are asked to mistake the structure of somebody 
else’s mind for our own” (Manovich, Language 61).  This statement is telling: Manovich 
treats users as produced subjects.  But Manovich also views the user interaction as purely 
cognitive in nature, disregarding, for instance, the precognitive perception as in itself worthy 
of consideration.  Manovich stretches the comparison beyond its capacity, and the 
combination is incoherent.  The ideological interpellation to which Althusser refers can not 
be equated with the formal process of digital interaction.  In essence, according to Manovich, 
we are under a process of cognitive regulation when we follow the preordained routes 
programmed into the relationship of algorithms and a database structure. 
 Ultimately, the question of interactive agency in digital narrative becomes too narrow to be 
productive anyway. Utopian descriptions of these non-linear narratives that allegedly invite 
libratory modes of usership ultimately close down digital media’s potential to narrative 
alone.  New media theorists such as Sean Cubitt therefore believe that narrative, while still a 
critical aspect of new media’s “avant-garde” potential, needs to be recognized as only one
possible element. As he explains, “narrative/anti-narrative is a binary opposition incapable of 
producing a new term beyond their polarity. The emergence of alternative media forms, by 
contrast, demands not dualism but a dialectical understanding capable of producing 
something new...narrative is no longer—if indeed it ever was—the central mode of 
communication” (Cubitt, Spreadsheets 6-7).  While it is important to avoid fetishizing 
newness in new media studies, for Cubitt narrative is not the correct manner of thinking 
about the interaction between users and digital realizations. 
16
 I agree with this.  How, for instance, can we acknowledge the sensing subject in all of its 
contextual complexity within such confines? Where might materiality factor into the digital 
event outside of the rigidity of formalist descriptions of a technology at work?  Ultimately, 
how can we engage with the temporal register in its material embodiment without making 
mandatory prescriptions as to cause and effect and agency?   
 The answer, paradoxically, may lie in an analysis of Soft Cinema and Texas. Specifically, 
closer analysis of digital ephemerality should serve as an example of how temporal aesthetics 
can take the place of narrative analysis in a more contextually-oriented analysis.  While it is 
certainly possible to link narrative elements in an associative manner when watching this 
kind of algorithmically driven media, the overwhelming promise of the piece is 
fragmentation. Despite Manovich’s intentions, in Texas no image can maintain a position of 
interest, despite the hierarchy of frames within the interface.  Furthermore, because the 
appearance of the images is seemingly random—and because Manovich’s coding allows the 
digital realization to never repeat itself—the images and sounds exist in an extended 
ephemeral and transitory state, constantly regenerating and renewing into new forms.  One is 
reminded of Katherine Hayles’ “flicker.”  All images struggle for dominance but never 
succeed; each momentarily passes into being and then falls away.   
 Texas is interesting to investigate precisely because—just like common digital culture on 
the internet and throughout varied mediascapes—it claims to do what it cannot actually do.  
It claims to promote narrative navigation through association, but it ends up falling to the 
perimeters of “cognition.”  Content slips; affect dominates.  What is crucial about this is the 
momentary profundity of each of the elements; but this profundity always takes place at the 
“edge of perception.” Temporality itself is the primary register of affect, rather than the 
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content of the piece.  In other words, it is not the formal arrangement or a cause and effect 
relationship that dominates perception.  It is, rather, the awareness of one’s own bodily 
relationship with the digital realization as it occurs.  When watching Texas one may be able 
to coordinate a possible narrative, but I would argue that this is not the overriding inclination.  
Texas encourages sense, not cognition.  
 It is clear that instead of looking to new forms of narrative, it is far more productive to 
investigate how the digital gives rise to new aesthetics: in particular, the aesthetic of 
ephemerality.  That aesthetic is of course still engaged with ideological context, the formal 
specificities of the digital, and crucially, the temporal and spatio-material axes of sensory 
perception. This methodological angle allows us to engage the phenomenological enframing 
that is so helpful for understanding the idiosyncrasies of digital textual generation. Further, it 
forces one to disengage with the primacy of the cognitive relationship between user and 
technology.  What matters here is sense as the materialization of the temporal.  Sensing 
bodies dwell on/in the temporal present presence. 
 Manovich maintains an interesting assumption regarding the manner in which digital form 
relates to materiality and virtuality, and it perhaps fuels his disregard for the user’s sensory 
perception.  Manovich assumes that the screen itself exists purely as representation.  
Commenting on the history of media representation in the face of a cultural dream for virtual 
interaction, he remarks: “a screen is still a screen...as was the case centuries ago, we are still 
looking at a flat, rectangular surface, existing in the space of our body and acting as a 
window into another space” (Manovich, Language 115).  Manovich assumes a definitive 
separation between the digital and the body and is therefore unable to understand the ways in 
which they interact beyond a cognitive level.   
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 This is the difference between digital representations and digital realizations. I would 
argue that “representations” anticipate a necessary split between media image/sound and 
sensory receiver, between what is “on the screen” and what is “in the mind,” and ultimately 
between perception and meaning.  “Realizations,” on the other hand, bridge these kinds of 
divisions, acknowledging the material presence of the digital across the perceptual field.  The 
move towards understanding the digital process as realization instead of representation does 
not deny the constructedness of the digital technology, nor the way that technology can 
maintain specific ideological social coding.  Rather, it simply affords a more complex 
relationship between bodies, text, and technology.  It is essential that we explore the ways in 
which the “screen” acquires its presence through the body’s own production and the ways 
that the digital enters into the body as material sensory presence. It is at this level that we can 
engage the process of temporal aesthetics through a concept like ephemerality.  
* * *
III.  So what exactly constitutes a temporal aesthetic? Simply put, temporal aesthetics 
function as particular forms of recognition of traces of time by a sensing body. Texas offers, 
above anything else, a shifting immediacy—traces of an always limited “now-ness.”  Each 
video clip, sound, chord, or fragment of dialogue only exists for a limited time.  Granted, this 
level of temporal awareness is entirely relative, and it is impossible to distinctly specify the 
intensity or true nature of that awareness.  As noted earlier, the ephemeral is relational and 
only gains meaning through contextual comparison.  How to locate it, then? 
 Digital ephemerality only functions as such because it works differently on the sensing 
body than non-ephemeral aesthetics.  Digitality offers impulses towards the ephemeral, a 
kind of shifting between the awareness of the immediate fragility of the digital realization 
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and the rooted centrality of the sensing body.  In this regard, the temporal register acquires a 
kind of immediacy that asserts itself through that bodily awareness.  Paul Virilio’s notion of 
“intensive” and “extensive” time might be a helpful way to think about the contextual nature 
of the temporal register (72).  Intensive time is the time of immediacy, of now, of hyperaware 
presence. It is a time beyond perception that also constitutes the stuff of perception.  
Extensive time is the time of history, of perspective, and of slowness.  According to Virilio, 
extensive time is no longer the paramount time; intensive time has taken over.  
 Digital ephemerality exists somewhere in between these two times, not strictly adhering to 
one mode of temporality, but reliant on both.  It finds itself falling constantly inwards, 
collapsing into “the core of time, a temporal atom there in each present instant, an 
infinitesimal point of perception from where extent and duration are differently conceived” 
(72).  But it can only move towards that intensive time because it is able to move away from 
extensive time.  The images and sounds in Texas are constantly moving towards a specificity 
that is itself threatened with disappearance.  This is because the temporal context itself is 
constantly shifting.  And as the images foreshadow that disappearance, each ephemeral 
fragment betrays its context in a more extensive history.  To experience Texas is to 
experience immediacy and a greater temporal awareness simultaneously. In other words, the 
“now” acquires a temporal context.  Marcel Proust provides apt metaphor for this tension 
with his description of the glass water jars in Swann’s Way:
I used to enjoy watching the glass jars which the village boys used to lower into the   
 Vivonne to catch minnows, and which, filled by the stream, in which they in turn were  
 enclosed, at once ‘containers’ whose transparent sides were like solidified water and   
 ‘contents’ plunged into a still larger container of liquid, flowing crystal, conjured up an  
 image of coolness more delicious and more provoking than they would have done  
 standing upon a table laid for dinner, by showing it as perpetually in flight between the  
 impalpable water in which my hands could not grasp it and the  insoluble glass in which  
 my palate could not enjoy it. (237) 
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Proust’s narrator’s synaesthestic experience of the cool jars of water is forever torn between 
the intensive presence of a momentary fragment plunged into an extensive body, the 
fragment dependent on a whole that is itself only part of something indeterminate—each 
element overlapping, dependent, and fleeting. Indeed, is it pertinent that the glass of water is 
far more available to his senses out of a cohesive narrative context (the meal at the dinner 
table falls short of the idea of a solitary taste), an isolated memory present only in sensory 
reflection.   
 Proust understood the overwhelming pervasiveness of the ephemeral aesthetic in the 
experience of the everyday: he helps point us towards the necessary connections between the 
sensory and temporal.  The intellect and the voluntary are the world of narrative, of 
cognition, of why.  The involuntary and the sensory are the potent indicators of—not 
narrative—but temporal possibility.  It should also be clear from Proust that narrative always 
implies too much closure within a fixed system.  That is why he consistently breaks 
narrative’s embrace and turns to alternative forms of temporal and sensory awareness.  To 
sense is always to relate the intensive and extensive registers of time.  Just as the taste of the 
tiny madeleine transports the narrator back to a childhood memory, the digital ephemeral 
finds its potential as fleeting sensory fragment that demands awareness of a greater temporal 
extension.  Temporal aesthetics allow movement within always shifting frames and they 
allow for an ever shifting context.  Further, because temporal aesthetics are wedded to 
sensory experience, they allow us to incorporate a far broader conceptualization of 
materiality into the digital user experience.  
 It is essential that we ground the experience of the temporal aesthetic in material presence 
so we can better understand the true embodiedness of the digital realizations and the 
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connections between user senses and digital realizations.  Laura Marks’ claim for the 
materiality of the virtual is a promising contribution towards establishing that presence.  Not 
only does she incorporate the sensual register into the virtual, but she ties in the entire 
context of the media encounter as well. She presents a model of five intersecting factors in 
which the digital accesses and incorporates materiality.  These factors are quantum, 
electronic, hardware, software, and social, and each one operates through technological and 
sensory links (177-191). She is specifically writing about online experience, but there is no 
reason why we can’t accommodate a theoretical translation between online and software 
generated experiences. The scale of course varies, but the digital parameters are similar: 
database, algorithm, interface.  Marks writes that digital works incorporate a relationship 
with the material world that... 
 ...offer alternatives to the discourse of transcendentalism that animates corporate-futurist   
 understandings of digital media.  They insist that electronic media occupy not a ‘virtual  
 space but a physical, global, socioeconomic space.  It all comes down to interconnected  
 bodies: subatomic bodies, the linked bodies of our computers, our own bodies that act in  
 sympathy with them, and the social body in which we all partake. These works invite us to  
 relate to...media in terms of our shared fragility, corporeality, and mortality. (177) 
 
This kind of criticism opens up a different way of thinking about the production of virtuality, 
forcing us to acknowledge, for instance, the physicality of electrons, the dollars that fund the 
delivery, the space of the digital production, and the “stuff” that makes up the interface itself.  
All of this materiality is thus wedded to the sensory experience of the virtual; in other words, 
it is through the aesthetic that the virtuality always acquires its present overt materiality.  
 Haptic criticism brings politics to sensing bodies.  At the same time that it recognizes the 
materiality of the senses, it also recognizes the embodiedness of digital technology.  It 
stretches the material across the entire spectrum of the digital realization, from electron to 
body to global context.  This perspective helps us to understand the digital ephemeral as a 
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socio-aesthetic—a “will-to-awareness” of the self as a part of a larger social context.  
Manovich is wrong when he claims that it is only through his “creative decision-making—
regarding which clips to use in the database, which parameters to select, how to weight them, 
and which temporal rhythm in the temporal development to follow—that the final film takes 
on aesthetic qualities.” (Soft Cinema Book 30)  This kind of aesthetic criticism implies an 
aesthetic derived from content, or in implicit need of it. That kind of aesthetic theory—one in 
which one is able to distinguish rightness from wrongness, adhere to truth, or arrive at any 
sort of specific judgment—is bankrupt.  Traditional aesthetics are ultimately bound up with 
particular knowledge structures and distributions of power, and they don’t propel us to a 
better kind of knowledge. A better knowledge would always give room for an experience of 
the contextual “now,” not in an idealist sense, but in a realistic one (hence my framing here 
of this knowledge as indeed only “better,” and anticipatory of the presence of power).  That 
is what this particular aesthetic perspective aims to do through an acquisition of material 
presence. 
 The aesthetic of ephemerality is a conditional aesthetic that arises out of feeling bodies in 
a digital world.  In this sense, digital ephemerality does not come directly from a piece such 
as Texas, rather it is enabled by bodies that happen to sense it.  In his 2001 book Reading the 
Figural, or Philosophy After the New Media, David Rodowick proclaims the approaching 
end of aesthetics in a digital world.  In its place, he argues, we live in a condition of the 
“figural.” 
 According to Rodowick, the figural is a condition of the new digital media technologies 
that afford new means of communication.  It represents the meeting point of the linguistic 
and plastic expressions: “ever permutable—a fractured, fracturing, or fractal space, ruled by 
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time and difference—it knows nothing...of identity.  The figural is not an aesthetic concept, 
nor does it recognize the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture.  It describes the logic 
of mass culture itself; or rather a culture of the mass” (x, 46).  Such a condition would 
certainly know nothing of aesthetics as traditionally conceived, aesthetics predicated on 
qualitative notions of beauty and harmony for instance, or utilized as part of the discursive 
construction of “art.”  This is, in fact, what Rodowick refers to when he suggests the ends of 
aesthetics in a digital world (x, 139).  
 Digital temporal aesthetics, on the other hand, maintain a social and ideological fluidity 
that is pinned to a mass of individual sensing bodies.  They can exist before judgement, 
before rationalization, and before cognition. The temporal aesthetic refers ultimately to the 
realm of pre-cognitive perception. Digital ephemerality perhaps is able to acknowledge the 
contemporary condition of the figural while reasserting the possibility for embodied 
meaning-making in the experience of the everyday.  Indeed, it is precisely around and 
through the everyday digital realization that temporal aesthetics find themselves circulating.  
Texas and other algorithmically driven digital artworks point out the possibility for that 
aesthetic presence.  These are the aesthetics that circulate through and around our various 
portable digital objects, our online experiences, and the broad digital mediascape that 
pervades our everyday. 
* * *
IV.  Digital ephemerality can be a pervasive and frequent partner to any kind digital media 
object; indeed there are a spectrum of media artworks that can help us understand how it 
arises in various contexts, and how it might come to supplant the narrative reach.  From 
2002-2005 Paul D. Miller (a.k.a. Dj Spooky that Subliminal Kid), toured a live performance 
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remix of D.W. Griffith’s 1915 film Birth of a Nation, entitled Rebirth of a Nation.13 This is a 
particularly interesting example because it asserts a live “author” into the algorithmic play.  
In the show, Miller uses digital editing software, as well as record turntables, to perform live 
mixes of the film along with music he composed and recorded in advance.  The entire 
performance is projected onto three screens that form a horizontal triptych.   
 Each screen is capable of yielding a different image, though at times they double or mimic 
or repeat each other.  Importantly, Miller stands in front of the screens in relative darkness, 
his silhouette gently illuminated by the green glow of his computer monitors, constantly 
moving, editing, cutting, and spinning records.  When Miller cuts video tracks together, he 
executes digital algorithms that he has programmed into the editing software.  In other words, 
editing patterns are pre-programmed, and he has merely to execute the command for specific 
patterns to take place.  One might even say he is “spinning” software.  This creates an 
interesting mixture of liveness and foresight and accident and proficiency.  In fact, the 
particular complexity depends entirely upon the digital technology Miller uses to assemble 
the piece. The eternal newness and unexpectedness that constitute the ephemeral aesthetic are 
only made possible by and through the digital. In this sense, even though there are a variety 
of different media at work in the piece—and even though the piece incorporates live 
performance—the digital aesthetic permeates.  Ephemerality is still paramount.  Impossible 
to focus on just one image, narrative breaks down completely.  Miller offers little semblance 
to Griffith’s original structure.  What was originally sacred is devalued. Instead of “reading” 
narrative, the event offers a sensory cacaphony. Rhythm eclipses the content of the piece, but 
 
13 Paul Miller maintains an extensive website with further information about Rebirth of a Nation:
<www.djspooky.com/articles/rebirth.html>  This article refers to a live performance at Memorial Hall in Chapel 
Hill, NC, September 23, 2005. 
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it is not closed symphonic rhythm; it is the rhythm that awakens bodies and questions 
perception.  
 But to experience Rebirth of a Nation under the sensory drift of ephemerality is not to 
ignore content altogether. Quite the opposite.  Narrative still functions in this piece—perhaps 
as a kind of anti-narrative—but I believe its strongest politics come from its aesthetics. It 
translates historical narrative into a kind of collective embodied presence. The relationship 
between performer, digital, and viewer/audience is primarily an active awareness of that 
presence, of the “realizing” of the digital realization, and of the potential behind the 
ephemeral energy of the performative moment. 
 Furthermore, Rebirth of a Nation allows the viewer to translate that presence into a greater 
historical awareness.  As “Dj Spooky,” Miller “haunts” the historical text in the refashioned 
present digital realization. Not only does Miller assert himself as a kind of new author, but 
the validity of the original film as document or documentation is problematized.  
Additionally, in the process, the digitality here answers to the need to question and 
contextualize history more generally.  As the digital refashions previously fixed truths, it 
points towards the specificity of the technology in the larger technohistorical framework.  
This is not a historical “narrative” persay, rather it exists as a kind of extensive temporal 
possibility—an awareness of history as problematic, as present, and as contingent. 
 Digital ephemerality perhaps finds its greatest resonance and potential impact on the web.  
Predicated on the possibility of ever-shifting and fragmented figural malleability, the web 
consistently unfolds in a palimpsestic wash of content.  The annual web event Neterotopia 
comments directly on the ephemeral nature of the internet with an online show of art that 
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deals directly with the issues of space and context.14 Artists transform the space of banner-
ads, paying for time and space to promote their own particular agendas.  Each 
advertisement/artwork follows the logic of the structural space, but reinterprets the traditional 
intent.  
 For instance, Iranian born artist Ghazel’s piece “Wanted” ran from March 16-31, 2006 in a 
banner space on the French culture contact website SortiraParis.com (translates to 
GetOutParis.com).  The website generally offers a series of links to bars, clubs, theatre, and 
other entertainment in Paris’s nightlife.  The banner ad runs in a small rectangle near the top 
of the page.  “Wanted” flashes a rotating series of 1-2 second images based upon a basic 
algorithm.  First, an image of a woman’s face appears, her eyes crossed out by a black bar.  
Next, another image appears that reveals the blacked out eyes.  Then, the word URGENT 
appears in classified newspaper style font, followed by a series of vital stats, her age, contact 
information, etc. (“Femme, 39 annes artiste, moyenne-orientale, ex S.P.F*. & R.D.D** en 
France...”), and a request for marriage for citizenship purposes.15 The banner ad then returns 
to the beginning and repeats.    
 “Wanted” points out the internal contradictions of the fragmented world of the internet.  
Again, meaning is eclipsed by the sheer density of signification.  It exists as a fleeting 
fragment of a far greater network of signifiers all battling for perceptive attention.  Despite 
the dramatic and critical nature of the advertisement’s content, it always hangs on the edge of 
disappearance.  But this does not necessarily speak simply to a postmodern dead-end.  




15 Abbreviations in the ad are designed to resemble classified advertisement abbreviations.  The asterisks are the 
artist’s own, and they simply reference further information within the work. 
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“lossy” quality of the image, the limited nature of its durability, and its relegation to a fringe 
banner site combine to create an interesting tension with the materiality of its creator, the 
money required for its operation, its form as advertisement, and the sensory requirements of 
its perception.  Far from contradicting the ephemeral aesthetic, this tension contributes to the 
fragility—and hence sustenance—of the aesthetic itself.  The digital ephemeral in this 
instance plays in a dialogue with potential narrative content, but it does not subsist entirely 
on that dialogue; in fact, it opens contextual awareness.  The artwork speaks to the profound 
potential behind the ephemeral banner space as a place for reinvention, for contradiction, and 
subversion.  This “effect” follows and parallels the aesthetic but it does not corrupt its 
potential.  It simply redoubles the possibility for fluidity and echoes its necessarily threatened 
existence. 
 Both Ghazel and Miller’s digital art therefore demonstrate how broad the reach of the 
ephemeral aesthetic can be in digital culture.  The presence of embodied authors, 
relationships to a priori realities and histories, and narrative intentions each engage with the 
temporal aesthetic in distinct ways.  It is not my intention to disregard these realities. Rather, 
I want to illustrate the potential for new material sensory relationships located around a 
particular experience of time in the context of those realities.  If post-structuralism taught us 
that a narrative account of user-experience will always be incomplete, then digital 
ephemerality as a conceptual tool allows us to reintroduce our sensory experience of time to 
the present experience of new media in the everyday.  Whether it is the internet, digital 
video, cell phones, the stock market, or any number of digital technologies, the temporal 
register maintains a primary relationship with the digital realization.  It is essential that a 
theory and a politics of new media take that relationship into account.    
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 It is of course critical that we not read the aesthetic of ephemerality as merely another 
element in the postmodern drive towards nullity and the fragmentary dispersion of meaning.  
The ephemeral involves a constant temporal play, and it is this play that disengages the 
constant string of signifiers and engages the social, material, sensing body.   
 It is especially ironic then that Manovich never acknowledges the sensory roots of his 
“Soft” Cinema, for it leads us directly to digital media’s foremost attribute.  “Softness” 
actually provides a way of articulating the haptic within the temporal registers of perception.  
It points always towards a present in a potentially political context.  If we embrace the 
temporal aesthetic as a theoretical tool, we open up possibilities for flexible critical 
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